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normally come with long-range communication connections;
they have short-range radios such as Wi-Fi [2], Bluetooth [3],
or Zigbee [4]. The blood-pressure monitor must somehow
get connected with other devices in the home such as a WiFi access point (AP) in order to transmit its medical data
to the physician’s EHR system. Making those connections
is difficult for many people [5] , especially considering that
different types of devices from different manufacturers often
have different methods of making a connection and that the
devices themselves often have very limited user interfaces.
A second problem with this blood-pressure scenario is
that once a connection is made between the blood-pressure
monitor and a device capable of transmitting data long
distances, the blood-pressure readings must get to the right
patient record in the right physician’s EHR system. This
I. I NTRODUCTION
implies that the blood-pressure readings must be augmented
Lately we have seen predictions of how the Internet of Things with additional credentials (e.g., patient ID, password) and
(IoT) is poised to make billions of everyday objects “smart” by destination information (e.g., a Restful API URL).
A third problem arises when devices partner with other
adding wireless communication capabilities. The dream is that
networks of these newly connection-enabled devices will give nearby devices so they can work together in a peer-to-peer
us greater insight into the behavior of complex systems than fashion, such as a blood-glucose monitor working with an
previously possible. The reality, however, is that configuring insulin pump. In these peer-to-peer cases the devices may
maintain a connection with a long-range communication device,
and managing billions of devices will be extremely difficult.
As they are normally envisioned today, IoT sensors are but may also need a connection with neighboring devices using
low powered devices that have one or more sensors with encryption based on a unique key for a specific pair of devices,
the ability to monitor an aspect of their local environment rather than a common key shared by all devices. Establishing
such as temperature, have limited computational capabilities, the encryption can be difficult if the devices have never met
and to save power, have short range radios such as Wi-Fi, before and have never shared a secret key.
To overcome these three and other difficulties inherent
Bluetooth, or Zigbee. The concept is that these devices will be
physically placed in areas of interest, will monitor aspects of in configuring wireless devices, we present a system called
the environment using their sensors, then will use their radio Wanda. Wanda introduces a small hardware device called the
to communicate their measurements to one or more distant ‘Wand’ that has two antennas separated by one-half wavelength
and uses radio strength as a communication channel to simply,
data repositories for aggregation and analysis.
As an illustration in the healthcare domain, imagine that securely, and consistent with user intent, impart information
a general-practice physician tells a patient that he’d like the onto devices. In this paper we focus on connecting devices,
patient to take home a wireless blood-pressure monitor and but the Wand could be used to impart any type of information
use it every day so that the physician can remotely monitor onto a nearby device. Wanda is more than just a solution for
the patient’s health. The intention is that the blood-pressure pairing devices or connecting to access points.
Wanda builds on pioneering work done by Cai et al. in
measurements taken by the patient will end up stored in the
patient’s Electronic Health Record (EHR) at the physician’s Good Neighbor [6] in that the Wand determines when it is in
clinic. The physician can then see the patient’s blood pressure close proximity to another transmitting device by measuring
on a daily basis and get automated alarms if any abnormal the difference in received signal strength on the Wand’s
two antennas. Wanda then expands upon Good Neighbor
readings are recorded.
At least three problems arise in making scenarios such as by exploiting wireless signal reciprocity to securely impart
at-home blood-pressure monitoring a reality. The first problem information in-band from the Wand onto the nearby target
is that blood-pressure monitors, like many IoT sensors, do not device.
Abstract—Nearly every setting is increasingly populated with
wireless and mobile devices – whether appliances in a home,
medical devices in a health clinic, sensors in an industrial setting,
or devices in an office or school. There are three fundamental
operations when bringing a new device into any of these settings:
(1) to configure the device to join the wireless local-area network,
(2) to partner the device with other nearby devices so they can
work together, and (3) to configure the device so it connects to
the relevant individual or organizational account in the cloud.
The challenge is to accomplish all three goals simply, securely,
and consistent with user intent. We present a novel approach we
call Wanda – a ‘magic wand’ that accomplishes all three of the
above goals – and evaluate a prototype implementation.
This Tech Report contains supplemental information to our
INFOCOM 2016 paper titled, “Wanda: securely introducing
mobile devices” [1]. Much of the additional information is in
Section II, III, and VI.

Unlike many other approaches, Wanda does not require any
specialized hardware (or any hardware changes) in the new
devices, does not require any pre-shared secrets, and does
not require complex algorithms or complicated cryptography
libraries. Furthermore, Wanda does not require the devices to
be adjacent, or even movable – useful for large appliances as
well as small mobile devices.
Using Wanda could hardly be easier: a person simply points
the Wand at a nearby device that requires connectivity and the
Wand almost magically imparts connectivity parameters onto
the target device. This happens one time and afterward the
Wand is not involved in future communications – the Wand
itself disappears from the picture.
A. Assumptions
Throughout this paper we make the following assumptions
about the “target device”, which is the device receiving
information from the Wand: (1) it has at least one radio antenna
that it can use to transmit and receive wireless data, (2) it can
measure the signal strength of wireless communication packets,
(3) it may be limited computationally, but can run a small piece
of software that implements the Wanda protocol, (4) it cannot
be relied upon to have additional sensors such as cameras,
microphones or accelerometers, and (5) it cannot be altered to
add new hardware.
We make the following assumptions about the Wand: (1) it
can be trusted to generate a secret key, (2) it has a radio
compatible with that of the target devices, and two antennas
located approximately one half wavelength apart, (3) it is easily
portable and can be brought next to and pointed at the target
device, and (4) it can run the Wanda protocol.
B. Contributions
Wanda is a novel approach for imparting information onto
a target device, even though the target device has never been
seen before, nor have any secrets been pre-shared. We make
four contributions in this paper:
1) a consistent, fast, easy, and secure method to impart any
kind of information onto commodity wireless devices,
regardless of device type or manufacturer, without
hardware modifications to the device;
2) protocols for imparting information onto new devices
(such as a Wi-Fi SSID and password), introducing two
devices so they can establish a secure and user-intended
connection, and imparting cloud identity and credentials
into a new device;
3) a prototype implementation and experimental evaluation;
and
4) a security analysis of the system.
II. R ADIO SIGNAL STRENGTH PRIMER
Wanda uses radio signal strength to impart information onto
devices; in this section we briefly review some basic concepts
that are key to Wanda’s operation. We start by reviewing the
theory behind how a signal travels through free space, then
examine how obstacles can affect the received signal strength,

and finally investigate variation in real-world signal strength
by capturing packets in three different environments. Wanda
leverages signal-propagation characteristics described in this
section to impart information on target devices and exploits
real-world environmental factors to make it virtually impossible
for adversaries to eavesdrop on Wanda communications. The
material in this section provides the theoretical foundations for
why Wanda should work, while Section VI shows that Wanda
does work.
A. Free space
A radio signal transmitted by an antenna attenuates, or fades,
as it travels through the air according to the well known freespace propagation model [7] given in Equation (1):

Pr = Ps Gs Gr

λ
4πd

2
(1)

where Pr is the power received in watts, Ps is the power at
the surface of the sending antenna in watts, Gs and Gr are the
gains of the sending and receiving antennas, λ is the frequency
of the signal, and d is the distance between the sending and
receiving antennas.
This model assumes the radio waves travel through free
space without bouncing off or passing through any obstacles
before arriving at a receiving antenna. Although reflections and
multipath signals where the waves bounce off objects can affect
the signal strength measured at a receiver (discussed in more
detail below), in general the distance factor d in the denominator
of Equation (1) tells us that as the distance between the
transmitter and receiver increases, the signal strength at the
receiver decreases.
It is sometimes useful to consider signal strength in relation
to a known amount of power. In that case, dBm (which
expresses power in decibels compared to one milliwatt (mW))
is often used. The conversion is given by Equation (2):


Pr
dBm = 10 log10
(2)
1 mW
Using Equation (2) we can rewrite Equation (1) in dBm for
free space [7]. This gives us:
 
d
Pr = P0 − 10α log10
(3)
d0
where Pr is now the received power in dBm, P0 is the power
in dBm received at a distance of d0 from the transmitter, d is
the distance between the sending and receiving antennas, and
α, called the path-loss exponent, represents the reduction in
power as the signal travels. In free space α is 2.
In the remainder of this report we use Px to indicate power
in dBm predicted by radio signal propagation models, and
we use Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) to indicate
power measured in dBm by actual hardware.

B. Obstacles
Equation (3) gives a good approximation of signal attenuation
in free space, but in the real world obstacles, moving and
fixed, can attenuate a signal or cause reflections that create
multiple paths between a transmitter and a receiver. The result
is that multiple copies of the transmitted signal, each with
a different attenuation, delay, and phase shift, arrive at the
receiver superimposed upon each other. This superposition can
result in either constructive interference where multiple copies
of the signal add to each other, or destructive interference
where multiple copies of the signal cancel each other. The
changes in signal strength caused by obstacles is often called
fading.
There are two types of fading: slow and fast. Slow fading
occurs when changes to the signal strength happen slowly
over time. Shadowing, where an obstacle such as a building
lies between the transmitter and receiver, is an example of
slow fading. In this case the alteration to the signal strength is
normally constant unless the transmitter or receiver move. Fast
fading occurs when changes to the signal strength happen
quickly such as when a moving obstacle comes near a
transmitter and receiver.
We can account for fading by altering Equation (3) to add
a noise component which, gives us the log-normal shadow
model [7]:
 
d
Pr = P0 − 10α log
+ χσ
(4)
d0

Location
Home
Coffee shop
CS lab

Mean
-60
-84
-61

Std Dev
0.69
1.50
3.48

Range
8
10
19

TABLE I
RSSI mean, standard deviation, and range (number of distinct values) of
12,000 Wi-Fi packets captured at three different locations. The standard
deviation and range of RSSI measurements increased as the number of
moving obstacles increased, but even the static home environment still
exhibited eight different RSSI readings.

C. Real-world observations

To understand the role environment plays in signal propagation, we captured the signal strength of Wi-Fi packets
exchanged between a computer and a Wi-Fi AP in three very
different (but realistic) locations where Wanda might be used.
The first was a quiet home environment where no one was
moving, the second was a local coffee shop where a small
number of customers were milling about, and the third was a
busy computer science lab bustling with student activity. We
used an Alfa Networks AWUS036H external Wi-Fi antenna [11]
and captured the RSSI returned by the Alfa card in the form of
RadioTap [12] headers. These RSSI values were captured using
a Python program written with Scapy [13]. In all cases the
receiving antenna was stationary while packets were exchanged
with the AP.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of RSSI measurements
where χσ is a Gaussian random variable representing noise returned by capturing 12,000 Wi-Fi packets sent between a Wiwith zero mean and standard deviation σ (in the case of slow Fi AP and the receiving antenna at each location. In the home
fading) or follows a Rayleigh or Rician distribution (in fast and computer science lab, the distance between the access point
fading environments). As noted above, in free space α is 2, and the receiver was approximately 4 meters. In the coffee
but it in real-world dynamic environments α often ranges from shop the distance was approximately 8 meters. The differences
1.2 to about 8 [8].
in distance led to differences in RSSI, and as expected the
In a dynamic environment where there are moving objects, presence (or absence) of moving obstacles lead to a varying
the χσ representing noise in Equation (4) can change rapidly, degrees of variability of the RSSI. When packets were captured
making actual measurements of RSSI highly variable. In a in the quiet home environment the RSSI readings were tightly
dynamic environment the moving objects are changing their grouped and had little variation; we saw increased variability in
position relative to the transmitter – which slightly changes the the coffee shop, and a great deal of variability in the busy lab.
length of the path taken by the portion of the signal reflecting Table I provides details on the mean, standard deviation, and
off from those obstacles. The difference in path length, in turn, range (number of distinct RSSI values) of the packet RSSIs
slightly alters the phase of the received signal. This change in captured.
phase can change how the multiple copies of the signal add
Although the variability in RSSI is lower in environments
up to create constructive or destructive interference. Finally, where there is little activity, it is important to note that there
the Doppler effect of the moving obstacle slightly changes the is still variability – it is not the case that RSSI readings
frequency of the received signal, and interference has been were the same for all packets. We saw that even in the quiet
shown to vary greatly depending on the frequency of the home environment that there were still eight different RSSI
signal [9].
values observed. Other researchers have found that even in
In addition to the environmental variables, the signal strength an underground concrete tunnel where outside signals and the
captured by real equipment is also subject to manufacturing effects of moving obstacles were not present, there was still a
variability as well as thermal noise in the antenna [10]. Wanda variation of at least 2 dBm away from the mean [10].
exploits the variability from manufacturing and thermal noise,
As we see in the next section, Wanda uses the equations
together with variability from obstacles in the environment, to in this section as the theoretical basis for its operation. It
make it difficult for an adversary to eavesdrop on communica- uses them to create two primitive operations from which it
tions between Wanda devices (see Section VII).
then builds more complex protocols. By using two antennas

that devices physically available to a person are legitimate
devices (e.g., the devices a person owns are not compromised)
but that other more distant device may be attackers. We’d like
to know with a high degree of certainty if radio signals are
emanating from the device at hand, and not a distant attacker.
As shown in Section II, however, the RSSI received by a device
can vary significantly which makes it a poor estimator of range.
Wanda can determine when a device is in close proximity by
using two antennas.
Each antenna in the Wand is capable of independently
measuring the power received and providing a Received Signal
Strength Indicator (RSSI). Building on Equation (4), the power
received on the two antennas of the Wand will be:
d1
) + χσ
d0
d2
P2 = P0 − 10α log10 ( ) + χσ
d0
P1 = P0 − 10α log10 (
Fig. 1. Distribution of 12,000 RSSI readings captured in three different
environments. The figures show a histogram of RSSI values measured, and a
best-fit Gaussian distribution for the RSSI values. Environments with more
moving obstacles had higher variability in RSSI values.
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Fig. 2. Wand with two antennas, A1 and A2 , separated by 7 cm in our
prototype. The distance between antenna A1 and the target device is d1 . The
distance between antenna A2 and the target device is d2 . The Wand is intended
to be pointed directly at the target device, so that d2 = d1 + 7 cm.

Wanda is able to overcome the unpredictable environmental
noise and impart secret information onto a nearby device while
making eavesdropping virtually impossible from more than a
few centimeters away.

(5)

where P0 is the power in dBm measured at a distance of
d0 from the transmitter, Pi is the power in dBm measured
at receiving antenna Ai , and di is the distance between the
transmitter and receiving antenna i.
Armed with the equations in (5), we can now calculate the
difference in signal strength between the two antennas A1 and
A2 as follows:
d1
P1 − P2 = P0 − 10α log10 ( ) + χσ
d0
d2
− (P0 − 10α log10 ( ) + χσ )
d0
(6)
d2
d1
= −10α( log10 ( ) − log10 ( ))
d0
d0
d1
= −10α log10 ( )
d2

The antennas on the Wand are physically close together; in
our prototype they are 7 cm apart (roughly 1/2 wavelength).
Wanda builds on two insights that can be gleaned from the Because they are close together, the environmental factors repconcepts highlighted in Section II. The first insight is that if a resented by χσ in Equation (6) are likely to be similar on each
device has two antennas, it can determine when it is in close antenna. By taking the difference in signal strength observed
proximity to another device that is transmitting radio signals. on two antennas, sometimes called the RSSI Ratio [14], the
The second insight, our major technical contribution, is that environmental factors tend to cancel out. This suggests that
when a device with two antennas determines it is in close some of the randomness of the environment we saw in our
proximity to another device, it can use its two antennas to real world observations in Section II will be minimized in the
RSSI Ratio on the Wand.
securely impart information onto the other device.
When the Wand and the target device are far apart, the
In Wanda, the Wand is the device with two antennas (see
Figure 2) and it uses those antennas to implement two primitive distance between antennas A1 and A2 is small relative to the
operations: detect and impart. This section explains these distance to the far transmitter. In that case the RSSI will be
approximately, although not precisely, equal on each receiving
primitives in detail.
antenna. For example, suppose antennas A1 and A2 on the
A. Detect primitive
Wand are 7 cm apart and are aligned with the transmitting
When a new device is introduced to an environment, one of antenna so that A2 is 7 cm farther away from the transmitting
the chief difficulties is determining whether radio signals are antenna than A1 (see Figure 2). In this case d2 = d1 + 7 cm.
actually coming from the new device or are really coming from Further suppose the distance between A1 and the transmitting
an attacker masquerading as a legitimate device. We assume antenna, d1 is 30 cm (i.e., more than 4 times the distance
III. A PPROACH

Expected RSSI Ratio at selected distances

where i is the ith packet transmitted and r1 (i) is the RSSI for
packet i measured on antenna A1 , r2 (i) is the RSSI for the same
18
packet measured on antenna A2 , τ is a fixed-value threshold to
16
determine if the devices are close, and ω is a window containing
the RSSI of the most recent packets received.
14
If the average difference δ̄ rises above a predetermined
12
threshold τ , then the Wand declares it is in close proximity to
the transmitting device. The Wand waits to check for proximity
10
until it has received at least ω packets, and re-checks for
8
proximity every ω/2 packets afterward using the last ω RSSI
values until it detects it is close to the device or times out.
6
In this way, the Wand can determine when it is in close
4
proximity to a transmitting device even if the device has only
a single antenna. If the device has multiple antennas, Wanda
2
assumes it will transmit packets using only one of its antennas
and will not change transmitting antennas while executing the
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
20
30
40
50
detect primitive.
Distance between TX and RX antennas (cm)
To execute detect, the user expresses the intent to start the
process
by taking an action such as pressing a button on the
Fig. 3. Expected difference in RSSI with d1 ranging from 1 to 50 cm. The
difference in RSSI readings increases rapidly as distance decreases.
target device. The target device then begins broadcasting an
AssocReq packet every 50 ms indicating that it is looking to
between the two antennas). In that case, using Equation (6) connect with another device. The Wand uses those broadcast
packets to determine whether it is in close proximity to the
and assuming α = 2 yields a difference, ∆, of:
device using Equation (9).
d1 = 30 cm
The Wand can provide its user visual or audio feedback to
d2 = 30 cm + 7 cm = 37 cm
(7) encourage the user to move the Wand closer if needed. The
Wand can change a row of LED lights or increase (decrease)
∆ = −10α log10 (30/37) ≈ 1.8 dBm.
the frequency of an audio tone if the spread between RSSI
When the Wand is close to the target device, the distance readings on the two antennas is becoming larger (smaller) to
distance between antennas A1 and A2 is large relative to the indicate if the Wand is getting closer to (farther from) the
distance to the transmitter. In that case the difference between target device. Additionally, a visual indicator such as a sticker
received power on the two antennas on the Wand will be large. bearing a Wanda logo could be affixed on top of the antenna
For example, assume the transmitter in Figure 2 is located location on the target device to make detect easier. The user
1 cm from A1 . In that case the expected RSSI difference is:
would then simply move the Wand close to the sticker and
initiate the detect process. See Figure 4 for an example of how
d1 = 1 cm
a logo could be affixed to a blood pressure monitor.
d2 = 1 cm + 7 cm = 8 cm
(8)
Once the Wand determines that it is in close proximity to
∆ = −10α log(1/8) ≈ 18.1 dBm.
the device, it sends an AssocAck packet to the target device.
This demonstrates that when the Wand is in close proximity The target device receives the AssocAck, stops transmitting
to a transmitting device, the difference in power readings packets, and begins listening for Message packets from the
between the Wand’s two antennas will be significantly larger Wand.
than the difference in power readings when the device is far
B. Impart primitive
away. In this example there is an expected 10-fold increase
After devices are in close proximity, the Wand can exploit a
in the RSSI Ratio when the Wand moves from 30 cm to
1 cm between the transmitter and A1 . Figure 3 shows how the property of radio wave propagation called reciprocity to impart
expected power changes as the distance between the device information onto another device. Reciprocity says that a signal
will experience the same multipath properties (e.g., attenuation
and transmitter changes.
Wanda determines whether the Wand and device are in close phase shifts, delays) in both directions of the link [7]. This
proximity by examining the average RSSI Ratio according to means that transmitting from the target device to the Wand
has the same fading characteristics as transmitting from the
the following procedure:
Wand to the target device. As we saw above, the Wand should
ω
1X
δ̄ =
r1 (i) − r2 (i)
(9) see a large RSSI Ratio when a transmitting device is close
ω i=1
to the Wand. Similarly, due to reciprocity, the device should

see a large difference in RSSI when the Wand transmits from
True if δ̄ ≥ τ
close =
antenna A1 vs. when it transmits from antenna A2 .
False if δ̄ < τ
RSSI Ratio

20

Fig. 4. Blood pressure monitor with Wanda logo indicating where to place
the Wand.

antenna A1 vs. A2 would be about 10.5 dBm by Equation (6).
This yields a situation where the signal strength of packets
sent from antenna A1 will be significantly higher than the signal
strength of packets sent from antenna A2 . Figure 5 shows an
example of the difference in RSSI at the receiving device of
1,000 Wi-Fi packets sent by transmitting antenna A1 located
3 cm from the receiver, intermixed with 1,000 packets sent by
transmitting antenna A2 located 10 cm from the receiver. It is
clear that there was a large difference in RSSI depending on
which antenna sent the packet. In this case, the RSSI values
are consistent with Equation (6) with the path loss exponent
α = 1.6.
To decode the message m sent by the Wand, the target
device simply calculates the average RSSI over all packets
received and then compares the RSSI value for each packet
with the average RSSI over all received packets. If the RSSI
for an individual packet is above the average, the target device
declares the packet to be a 1. If the RSSI is below the average,
the target device declares the packet to be a 0. More formally:
n

RSSI from two transmitters

r̄ =

−49

1X
r(i)
n i=0

(10)

−50


m̂(i) =

−51
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Packet
Fig. 5. Large difference in RSSI received from 1,000 Wi-Fi packets sent by
antenna A1 located 3 cm from the receiving antenna, compared with 1,000
Wi-Fi packets sent by antenna A2 located 10 cm from the receiving antenna.

Wanda exploits the expected difference in RSSI on the target
device to impart information. The Wand first converts the data
to impart onto the device into a binary string m and then sends
m one bit at a time. To send a 1, the Wand sends a Message
packet using the closest antenna, A1 . To send a 0, it sends a
Message packet using the farthest antenna, A2 . If the Wand
and device are physically close together, the device will see
a large difference in RSSI depending on which antenna the
Wand used. For example, if we assume as above that the Wand
is pointing directly at the device and the distance d1 between
A1 and the device is 3 cm, then with α = 2, the different in
signal strength received on the device between a packet sent by

1
0

if r(i) ≥ r̄
if r(i) < r̄

where r(i) is the RSSI measured on the single antenna of the
target device for packet i and m̂(i) is the ith bit in the message
received. Once this process is complete the device will have a
string m̂ representing the string m sent by the Wand.
To ensure the target device is not missing any bits in message
m due to dropped packets, each Message packet sent by the
Wand carries an increasing sequence number in the payload.
The target device uses the sequence number of each packet to
determine whether it missed any packets. If any packets are
missing the device requests a resend of only those missing
packets; otherwise it sends an empty list to the Wand.
To be clear, the information is transferred using the RSSI
alone – the packets themselves sent do not contain portions of
the message m. The payload only contains a sequence number
so the target device can identify any missing bits.
The Wand sends the entire message without waiting for
acknowledgement from the target device. When all message
bits have been transmitted, the Wand sends a Done packet.
The Done packet is similar to a Message packet, but it also
includes a hash of m in the payload. Once the target device
receives the Done message, it computes the value for each bit,
creating message m̂ on the target.
Finally, the target device hashes m̂ and compares it with the
hash of m included in the Done packet. If the hashes match,
the device received all of the packets correctly. If the hashes
do not match, the target device tries flipping each bit in m̂, one
at a time, re-hashes, and compares with the hash sent by the
Wand. If a match is still not found, the target device follows a
similar pattern but tries flipping two bits. If a match is still not
found, the target device signals the Wand to restart by sending
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-64
Correct
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01101000011001010110110001101111

Bit String

Bit String

Fig. 6. Receiving a message m of “hello” at distances of d1 = 3 and 30 cm.
Packets representing bit values of 1 should be received on the target device
with an RSSI above the average and packets representing bit values of 0 should
be received below the average. Circles represent bits received correctly and
X’s represent errors. The message was received with no errors at 3 cm, but
had numerous errors at 30 cm.

a Restart packet. If a match is found, the device transmits a
Success packet to the Wand.
If the message to be imparted is long, it could be sent in
chunks to enable the target device to efficiently flip bits. On
the other hand, if messages are short they may be susceptible
to an adversary discovering the message by brute-force flipping
bits and hashing. To protect against these potential exploits
Wanda can chunk long messages and pad short messages into
128-bit messages.
To illustrate the impart primitive, we converted the message
“hello” into binary and sent it to a target device using the
impart primitive. Figure 6 shows the results. The message was
easily decoded at a distance d1 = 3 cm and had many errors
with d1 = 30 cm.
IV. P ROTOCOLS

above. The blood-pressure monitor must learn the SSID and
password of a Wi-Fi AP. In this case we expect the Wand has
earlier learned the SSID and password from the Wi-Fi AP over
a wired USB connection. One can imagine the Wand being a
7 cm stick that lives in the USB port of the AP, keeping its
batteries charged so it is ready when needed, and using the
USB to securely obtain the connectivity parameters from the
AP.
The Wand and target device then implement the Common
Key protocol as follows: the Wand and target device run the
detect primitive to determine if they are close together. Once
the Wand determines it is in close proximity to the target device
it runs the impart primitive to send the SSID and password
to the target device. After the target device has confirmed it
has properly received the message, flipping bits if necessary as
described in the impart primitive, the target device connects
to the Wi-Fi AP using the SSID and password it received, and
the Wand is then not required for future communications.
B. Unique Key protocol
A slightly more complicated scenario arises when a user
wants two devices to establish a connection using a key that is
unique to those two devices. In this case the Wand can facilitate
the introduction of the devices. The Unique Key protocol starts
with the Wand generating a random key R. The Wand and
Device 1 run detect and impart to send R to Device 1. The
Device 1 includes its IP address (if it has one) in the payload of
the Success message at the end of impart and the Wand notes
the IP address as well as the MAC address of the target device
from the packet headers. The user then carries the Wand close
to Device 2 and the Wand then imparts R plus the MAC and
IP address of Device 1 to Device 2 using detect and impart.
Device 2 can now open direct communications with Device 1
by sending a hash of R to Device 1 at the MAC or IP address
obtained from the Wand. Device 1 receives the hash from
Device 2 and hashes its own copy of R. If the hashes match,
then Device 1 bootstraps a MAC or IP layer connection with
Device 2 using R as an initial key. If the hashes do not match,
Device 1 does not attempt the connection.
C. Copy and Paste protocol

A third Wanda protocol is Copy and Paste. In Copy and Paste
Wanda uses the primitive operations detect and impart one device has information that the user would like imparted
described above to build protocols for configuring new devices. onto another device, although there may be no need for the
In this section we define three higher-level protocol operations: devices to form a lasting pair as in the Common Key or Unique
(1) Common Key, where a target device is imparted with Key protocols. An example of where Copy and Paste could be
parameters that are common to all devices in a local-area useful is the blood-pressure monitor scenario described above.
network, and (2) Unique Key, where two devices connect with As shown above, the patient can use the Common Key protocol
a key unique to that pair of devices, and (3) Copy and Paste to link the blood-pressure monitor to a Wi-Fi AP, and while
where the Wand copies data from one device and pastes it onto that solves the problem of getting a long-range communication
connection for the short-range blood-pressure monitor, it does
another without creating a lasting bond between devices.
not solve the problem of getting the data stored in the patient’s
A. Common Key protocol
EHR. For data storage to happen the blood-pressure monitor
The Common Key protocol is used when a new device must must know where and how to send the data. The blood-pressure
be configured with information common to all devices in a monitor must know things such as a Restful API URL to send
local-area network such as the blood-pressure monitor described the medical readings, as well as the patient’s credentials such

as ID and password so the data can be stored in the correct
patient record in the EHR.
Copy and Paste is designed to solve this problem. Continuing
with the medical example, the patient brings the Wand to the
doctor’s office and performs the Copy phase by using detect
and impart to send a random key R onto a device in the
doctor’s office. The doctor’s office device encrypts the patient’s
credentials using R as a key and sends the resulting cypher
text c to the Wand. The Wand stores the cypher text until
the patient returns home. The patient then performs the Paste
phase by using detect and impart to send random key R and
cypher text c to the blood-pressure monitor. The blood-pressure
monitor then decrypts the data and begins sending data to the
doctor while the Wand deletes the cypher text. In this way, the
Copy and Paste protocol copies the data from one device and
pastes it onto another device, even though the devices may be
physically far apart.

Fig. 7. Prototype Wand and A&D Medical blood-pressure monitor as target
device (some cables removed for clarity).

V. I MPLEMENTATION
systolic, diastolic, and pulse, the Raspberry Pi reads those
We implemented a Wand prototype using a Raspberry Pi 2 measurements and securely passes them to the simulated EHR.
Model B computer [15] connected to two external Panda Ultra
We used Python and Scapy to create Wi-Fi data packets in
Wireless N USB Wi-Fi adapters [16]. Figure 7 shows a photo of our prototype and packets were sent at Layer 2. While our
the prototype Wand and medical device. A production version prototype used Wi-Fi, the technique could also be adapted for
would benefit by using one Wi-Fi card that has multiple other protocols such as Bluetooth or Zigbee.
antennas (commonly found on 802.11n or 802.11ac Wi-Fi
VI. E VALUATION
devices). This single-radio, dual-antenna approach would ensure
consistent energy is transmitted by the two antennas and could
We evaluated both the detect and impart phases of Wanda.
help reduce the potential for fingerprinting attacks [17], [18] by For the evaluation we used the same software as our prototype,
generating the radio frequency energy from the same source. but for easier control and monitoring of our experiments we
We used an FDA approved A&D Medical UA-767PC blood- used a MacBook Pro instead of a Raspberry Pi.
pressure monitor [19] as the target device. Because we were
unable to modify the software on FDA approved medical A. Detect tests
devices, we added an external Raspberry Pi with a single
We conducted 1,000 trials of the detect primitive where the
Alfa Networks AWUS036H Wi-Fi antenna [11] and connected distance d1 between the Wand’s A1 antenna and the device’s
to the blood-pressure monitor using a RS-232 over USB antenna ranged between 1 and 50 cm. Trials were conducted
connection. This gave us the ability to extract the blood-pressure at 1 cm intervals from 1 to 10 cm, then at 10 cm intervals
readings from the blood-pressure monitor using the RS-232 from 10 to 50 cm for a total of 14 distances with 1,000 trials
connection and the ability to communicate with the Wand each. The percentage of trials where the Wand detected it was
over the single Wi-Fi antenna. Of course the manufacturer of in close proximity to the device is shown in Table II using
the medical device would be able to alter their software to a window size ω = 20 and a threshold value τ = 6.2. We
include the Wanda protocols (Wanda does not require hardware chose this value for τ because the equations in Section III
modification as long as the device has wireless connectivity), estimate that detect will declare the devices in close proximity
but our prototype demonstrates that even an existing device when d1 is less than 6 cm. We found that at distances less
without a radio can be easily retrofitted to the conform to than 5 cm, proximity was detected 100% of the time. At 5 cm
Wanda. We imagine the retrofit device to be a small dongle proximity was detected 87% of the time, and at 6 cm proximity
instead of our prototype Raspberry Pi-based system.
was detected 38% of the time. At distances longer than 6 cm
We then used the prototype Wand to impart two types proximity was not detected. These results suggest that detect
of information onto the retrofit blood-pressure monitor. First was able to correctly determine when it is in close proximity
we imparted the SSID and password of a local Wi-Fi AP to the device with high probability.
so the device could establish a connection and get to the
internet. Second, we imparted the URL and a username and B. Impart tests
password for a Restful API representing a web service end
We tested Wanda’s ability to correctly impart data by first
point into a medical Electronic Health Record (EHR) in the confirming the RSSI differences behaved as expected, then
cloud. The result is that now when someone measures their sent 1,000 messages from the Wand to the target device at

Distance
< 5 cm
5 cm
6 cm
> 6 cm

Detected close
100%
87%
38%
0%

Predicted and measured RSSI difference

TABLE II
Percentage of time where the detect primitive detected close proximity. The
Wand implemented detect and successfully discerned proximity with high
accuracy at close range while correctly determining it was not in proximity at
longer ranges.
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Fig. 8. Observed RSSI differences on a single-antenna device from 1,000 pairs
of packets sent by the Wand alternating between antennas. The box represents
the 75th and 25th percentiles of the observed RSSI differences, the red line is
the median, and the whiskers represent the range of differences. The predicted
RSSI difference according to Equation (6) is shown with α = 1.6.

Bit errors in 128-bit message
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various distances and counted bit errors to determine the Wand’s
effective range. Finally we measured how fast the Wand could
impart information on target devices.
1) RSSI differences: To confirm that a single-antenna device
is able to correctly receive a message when using the impart
primitive, we tested whether it would consistently measure a
significant difference in RSSI based on the Wand’s transmitting
antenna (A1 or A2 ) as predicted by the equations in Section III.
In these tests the Wand sent 1,000 Wi-Fi data packets from
each of its two antennas, alternating between antenna A1 and
A2 , where the distance d1 between antenna A1 and the device
ranged from 1 to 50 cm and the distance d2 was 7 cm larger
than d1 . For this experiment, each Message packet contained a
sequence number as specified in the impart primitive, as well
as an indication of which antenna sent the packet to avoid
confusion over which antenna actually sent the packet.
The target device recorded the RSSI of each packet and
calculated an RSSI difference for each of the 1,000 pairs of
packets it received. The results are shown in Figure 8 along
with the RSSI difference predicted by Equation (6). The plot
shows that the values observed mirror the predicted values
when α = 1.6.
2) Bit errors: Next we measured how well the Wand was
able to impart information on another device. We ran 1,000
trials where the Wand sent a 128-bit random message to a
single-antenna target device, and then counted the number
of mismatched bits. Figure 9 shows that very few bit errors
occurred at close range, but the number of errors increased
significantly as distance between the Wand and the receiver, d1 ,
increased. Because each message contained 128 bits, random
guessing should yield 64 correct bits. In our experiments this
began to happen at a distance of about 30 cm.
To understand why impart yielded similar results to random
guessing at longer ranges, we examined the variation of
the difference in the RSSI Ratio at various distances. We
observed that as distance increased between the Wand and
the device, the standard deviation of the RSSI Ratio also
increased. This is because at close distances the direct lineof-sight signal dominates the multipath signals. At longer
distances the distance traveled by the line-of-sight signal and
the multipath signal are not as divergent, resulting in much
larger variation in RSSI at longer distances [20]. Figure 10
shows the expected RSSI Ratio at various distances and the
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Fig. 9. Bit errors decoding a 128-bit message. The box represents the 75th
and 25th percentile, the red line is the median, and the whiskers represent the
range of bit errors.
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Fig. 10. At 30 cm and greater the expected difference between a packet sent
from antenna A1 vs. a packet sent from antenna A2 was less than the standard
deviation in the observed RSSI Ratio.

Fig. 11. Likelihood of successful message by flipping up to three bits. At
distances less than 6 cm messages were received with high probability.

attempting to eavesdrop on communications between the Wand
and the target device, and active adversaries attempting to
inject malicious information onto the target device or Wand.
We assume an adversary has complete knowledge of the Wanda
standard deviation of the RSSI Ratio of 1,000 packets sent protocol and can use that knowledge to try to exploit the system.
at each distance. We see that at 30 cm the variation in RSSI
We assume the adversary:
Ratio becomes equal to the expected RSSI Ratio, and exceeds
• is able to receive, tamper with, or inject packets into the
the expected RSSI Ratio at longer distances. This suggests
communications between the Wand and target device,
that at distances of greater than about 30 cm, environmental
• is able to modulate its transmit power,
factors described in Section II make it extremely difficult for an
• may have multiple antennas and be positioned at multiple
adversary to determine which antenna sent a particular packet.
locations,
Some of these errors can be corrected with the bit-flip
• does not try to jam the communications channel, creating
technique described above where the target device flips bits
a denial of service,
in its derived message m̂ and re-hashes. Figure 11 shows the
• does not have physical access to tamper with the Wand
percentage of successful message transfers at distance from 1
or target device, and
to 50 cm, correcting bits when needed, by flipping zero to three
• is located more than 30 cm away from the target device
bits. From this graph we see that messages were transferred
and Wand while they are communicating.
with a high probability of success when the Wand was less
than 6 cm from the device. Due to the variability in RSSI
A. Eavesdropping
Ratio, however, the bit-flipping technique is not effective at
Because the bits in the message m sent by the Wand are
long range. This suits a legitimate user well because the devices
are close together, but makes a distant attacker’s task difficult. encoded only in the Wand’s choice of transmitting antenna,
3) Timing: We also measured the speed at which the Wand an adversary must determine which antenna sent a packet in
was able to impart a message. The average time to send 128 order to decode the information transferred. There are three
bits was 0.454 seconds which translates to just over 280 bits per main ways this could be done by an adversary: (1) receive
second. We note that our implementation was written in Python. packets from only one Wand antenna, (2) use the environment
An implementation in C might have seen even faster throughput, to differentiate between antennas, and (3) analyze the RSSI to
although for many applications transferring a message in under differentiate between antennas.
half a second is acceptable. Additionally, long messages can Receive packets from only one Wand antenna:
be sent by imparting a key and then using that key to encrypt
If it were possible for an adversary to receive packets sent
normal packets carrying data in their payload.
by only one of the Wand’s antennas – not both – the adversary
would be able to determine which antenna sent all of the bits
VII. S ECURITY
in a message. The adversary would simply list the packet
In prior sections we show that Wanda works well; in this sequence numbers it receives and infer those packets represent
section we evaluate its security against passive adversaries a bit with a value of 1. For the sequence numbers the adversary

Use the environment to differentiate between antennas:
An attacker might also attempt to determine which antenna
sent a packet by detecting differences in the signal due
to environmental effects. Because the characteristics of the
received signal depend on the specific paths taken as the signal
travels from the transmitter to the receiver, and signals from
different transmit antennas might take different paths to an
adversary, the adversary might be able to determine which
antenna sent each packet. The chances of this attack succeeding,
however, are vanishingly small. Cai et al. calculated the odds
of an attacker succeeding with this type of attack from a
random location to be 10−15 [6]. They go on to suggest that, in
theory, an attacker might choose an ideal location by carefully
measuring locations, geometries, and surface properties of all
objects in the environment. While this precise measurement is
practically impossible, nevertheless even that attack could be
mitigated by incorporating a frequency-hopping scheme where
each packet is sent on a different Wi-Fi frequency.
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does not receive, it can assume those packets came from the
other antenna on the Wand and infer those represent a bit value
of 0. After all the packets are sent, if the adversary does not
drop any packets, the adversary will either be correct on all
bits (the monitored antenna was actually sending 1s), or wrong
on all bits (the monitored antenna was actually sending 0s) in
which case the adversary simply flips all bits.
The adversary’s dilemma is that both antennas on the Wand
are close together and radiate energy that travels outward in a
spherical shape. This makes receiving signals from only one
antenna very difficult. An adversary could try to use a highly
directional antenna and attempt to create a narrow main lobe
pointed precisely at one of the antennas on the Wand. Given
that the antennas on the Wand are only 7 cm apart, this is
unlikely to work if the attacker is located a reasonable distance
away because the main lobe expands with distance and should
encompass both of the Wand’s antennas.
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Fig. 12. RSSI distribution of 1,000 packets sent where d1 = 3 cm and 50 cm.
At close range there was a distinct difference between antennas whereas at
longer distances the gaussian distributions of packet RSSIs heavily overlapped.

from which distribution that sample is drawn, that is, which
antenna is most likely responsible for sending the packet.
The distributions are constantly changing due to changing
environmental factors, however, making this assumption of
a priori knowledge of the Gaussians unrealistic.
Even if an attacker somehow did have perfect knowledge
of the Gaussian distributions that characterize packets sent by
each antenna on the Wand, the adversary will still suffer from
a large number of errors when observing from long distances.
Figure 13 shows that, even if armed with perfect knowledge
of the packet distributions, an adversary only a short distance
away would still make nearly 50% bit errors predicting which
antenna sent a packet using the Gaussian distributions. We
Analyze the RSSI to differentiate between antennas:
conducted those experiments with a prototype built with two
Wanda uses a simple algorithm on the target device to radios (rather than one radio), cheap antennas (not specifically
determine which antenna sent a packet based on the RSSI, but selected for a spherical radio dispersion pattern), and without
we assume an adversary can use more sophisticated techniques. precise antenna alignment (see Figure 7); a commercial Wand
While we cannot anticipate every possible technique, we expect (with a single radio and two antennas selected and aligned
from Equation (6) that the difference in RSSI when the Wand carefully) would be even harder to attack in this manner.
uses antenna A1 vs. when it uses antenna A2 will be small
when the Wand is not close to the adversary. Additionally,
B. Malicious packets
the environmental noise described in Section II increases as
distance increases. Figure 12 illustrates these differences for
An active adversary may attempt to inject information onto
1,000 packets sent by antenna A1 and 1,000 packets sent by the target device by tricking the target device into believing it is
antenna A2 at d1 = 3 cm and d1 = 50 cm. As expected, communicating with the Wand while the Wand is not actually
the RSSIs of packets from the same transmit antenna form a present. Wanda defends against the attack by asking the user to
Gaussian with a distinct mean (due to distance) and standard declare the intention to start the protocol on the target device
deviation (due to noise).
by taking an action such as pushing a button on the target
If an adversary were somehow armed with knowledge of device. This ensures that when the Wand is not present, the
the Gaussians of each antenna on the Wand, they might be target device will not begin running the Wanda protocols. In
able to determine which antenna sent a packet. When a packet that case, if an adversary were to try to communicate with the
arrives, the adversary could measure the RSSI and determine target device, the target device would not respond.
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Fig. 13. Percentage of bit errors if adversary had perfect knowledge of
RSSI distributions by antenna. Even with the unrealistic assumption of perfect
knowledge, an adversary would still make numerous errors.

Systems employing an OOB approach use a secondary
channel to exchange secret information (e.g., a cryptographic
key) that is used to secure the primary channel’s communication.
While many methods have been proposed, they often use the
wired [21], visual [22]–[27], audio [28], [29], gesture [30], [31]
or secondary radios such as RFID or NFC [32] channels to
convey secret information. These approaches, however, assume
the presence of hardware that may not be present on some
devices and may also require complex processing that exceeds
the capabilities of embedded devices.
Wanda differs significantly from these all of these approaches
in that it does not assume the presence of specialized hardware
other than the existing wireless radio, nor does it require
advanced processing power. Furthermore, Wanda requires little
human effort and the Wand’s mobility allows it to be used
when devices that are not physically adjacent or would be
inconvenient to move (such as a treadmill and a Wi-Fi AP).
B. In-Band

Researchers have also suggested techniques that do not
require an OOB channel, but instead exploit characteristics of
Alternatively, an adversary could try to override the infor- the in-band radio channel. These techniques are typically more
mation sent by the Wand while the Wand is communicating closely aligned with Wanda than OOB techniques.
with the target device. To override the Wand, an adversary
Although Gollakota et al. developed an in-band method to
might modulate its transmission power; increasing power to defend against Man-In-The-Middle attacks [33], their approach
send a 1 and decreasing power to send a 0. The target device, alters the Wi-Fi protocol. Most in-band approaches, however,
which may have only a single antenna, has no way of knowing use characteristics of the radio channel to develop a secret
if these modulated signals are coming from a nearby Wand key independently on two devices. To develop the secret key,
or from a distant adversary because the RSSI of the packets each device typically goes through several phases. The first
would appear to the target device in the same way packets phase is bit extraction where each device monitors a common
appear from the Wand. To prevent this attack, the Wand can radio channel simultaneously and extracts bits from extreme
monitor for rogue Message packets that it did not send. If it signal fluctuations to form a string of bits. The next phase,
detects rogue packets, the Wand can send a Stop packet to the reconciliation, ensures both devices have extracted the same
target device to halt the process.
bit string. Reconciliation normally involves several rounds
The Wand can protect itself from storing malicious data exchanging information about portions of the bit string, such
(as in the Copy and Paste protocol), by ensuring any received as checksums, in the clear. Finally, a privacy amplification phase
packets have a large RSSI ratio. This test would ensure the data reduces the size of the bit string to form a secret key that is
came from a nearby target device, and not a distant attacker known to the participating devices and unknown with high
attempting to exploit the Wand.
probability by an adversary [34]. Several works use a variant of
this extraction-reconciliation-amplification approach [35]–[37].
VIII. R ELATED WORK
The extraction-reconciliation-amplification approach has
Researchers have proposed many solutions to the problem several shortcomings. First, it is quite slow, often taking 30
of securely configuring new devices. While the proposed seconds or more to make connections. Wanda is fast, taking
approaches vary widely, they can be categorized into two less than half a second on average to send a 128-bit message.
main groups: out-of-band (OOB) and in-band communications. Another problem is that Wi-Fi, in many practical environments,
In OOB solutions a secret key is exchanged between devices lacks the necessary entropy to extract a secure bit string [10].
over a secondary communication channel that is impervious Wanda does not rely on random environmental fluctuations to
to observation and interference by an adversary; the devices generate common bits on two devices; it imparts the bits onto
then bootstrap a secure connection over the primary channel a target device based on the antenna chosen by the Wand.
using the information exchanged over the secondary channel.
Wanda does share common elements with two papers. In
In-band approaches differ in that they only use the primary Good Neighbor [6] the authors use the equations in Section III
communication channel to establish a secure connection. In of this paper to determine whether a sending device with a
this section we examine some of the proposed solutions and single antenna is in close proximity to a receiving device with
highlight some of their differences with Wanda.
two antennas. Good Neighbor, however, runs 8 times slower on

average than Wanda and only protects the two-antenna receiver –
it does not protect the single-antenna sender. For example, using
the Good Neighbor final protocol, if an adversary sends its
public key to the sender before the receiver does (as in a ManIn-The-Middle attack), the adversary can pair with the device
for 11.64 seconds on average before the receiver determines its
pairing failed and alerts the user. During that time the sending
device has no idea it is connected to an attacker. Furthermore,
when the user discovers the intended receiver is not connected,
the user will likely suspect the pairing simply failed and may
re-start the connection process, leaving the attacker with an
ongoing valid connection. As noted in Section VII, however,
Wanda protects both devices while they communicate. Also,
with Good Neighbor at least one of the devices must be mobile
so two devices can be placed in close proximity. If both devices
are difficult or impossible to move, then Good Neighbor will
not work. With Wanda, however, the Wand easily can move
close to multiple non-mobile devices.
Another recent approach called SeAK [38] uses two antennas
to develop a secret key, but in that paper each device
independently develops a key based on the RSSI of exchanged
packets. In Wanda, the Wand knows the secret information and
imparts it onto the other device without the need for the Wand
to develop the same key as the target device.
IX. F UTURE WORK
Wanda’s ability to impart data onto a device could be useful
in a variety of areas, but in future work we intend to build
on Wanda to create a larger mobile healthcare solution. That
expanded solution will give multiple doctors the ability to
request mobile health data from patients, allow patients to
approve or deny requests, and allow patients to easily manage
those permissions. For example, a patient’s general practice
physician might request blood pressure data as illustrated in
Section I, but so might the patient’s cardiologist (who may
belong to a different organization that uses a different EHR
system). This suggests the blood pressure data might need to
get to multiple EHR systems, assuming the patient approves
the doctor’s requests. Wanda currently does not address this
issue.
Another future direction is to create the Wanda system
with protocols other than Wi-Fi. Many medical devices use
Bluetooth or Zigbee. An extended Wanda could be useful for
communicating with those devices.
X. C ONCLUSION
In this paper we introduce a system called Wanda. Wanda
is able to simply, securely, and consistent with user intent,
impart data onto devices. Among other uses, this data can
be used for three fundamental operations when bringing a
device into a new setting: (1) configure new devices to join a
wireless local-area network (using Common Key), (2) partner
devices with other nearby devices so they can work together
(using Unique Key), and (3) configure devices so they can
connect to accounts in the cloud (using Copy and Paste). Wanda
does this by implementing two primitive operations, detect

and impart, which allow a new piece of hardware called the
Wand to detect when it is physically near another device,
then impart information onto that nearby device using a novel
radio signal strength method of communication. Experiments
with our prototype implementation show that Wanda is fast
and effective, and our security analysis demonstrates that it
should be resistant to passive and active adversaries. Indeed, we
expect Wanda is faster, easier, more flexible, and more secure
than existing alternatives for device pairing and for intentional
interaction with wireless devices.
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